in accordance with anti-cyclical approaches inspired by Keynes), lent firm impetus to the growth of productive activities; these soon recovered from the adverse effects of the world crisis and were to reach higher levels.

As of 1935, Mexican industry began a stage of vigorous expansion. Gradually, the idle capacity of industry was utilized more and more; the sector began to attract new investments and, soon after, foreign capital as well. Not even the expropriation of oil from US and British companies, decreed in 1938, could stop the flow of foreign investments in manufacturing. In particular, US capital found in manufacturing industries a new area for directing its resources, which in later years was to be considered preferential.

Notes

1. The number of kilometres of railways in service, which totalled approximately 1,000 in 1880, rose to some 6,000 in 1884, 11,000 in 1894, 14,000 in 1900, and 19,000 in 1910.
2. The regime of dictator Porfirio Díaz (1876, 1877–1880, and 1884–1911).
3. The Porfiriato.
4. See James W. Wilkie, *The Mexican Revolution, Expenditure and Change since 1910* (University of California Press, 1970).

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THE POLITICAL MODERNIZATION OF MEXICO (1867–1940)

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Introduction

In the realm of the social sciences, the concept of modernization has never been given a generally accepted definition. As is the case with many of our poorly defined terms, it has been necessary to resort to indicators to afford it real substance. Widely used in the 1960s, the concept itself has been the object of harsh criticism, to the extent that it has been compared to one of the several forms of evolution of national societies, i.e. the one germane to Western Europe and the United States.

Despite its limitations, the term is still useful in that it helps us to consider the major transformations of a given society from a comparative viewpoint, which could take the form – among other possibilities – of a historical comparison. Obviously, the process of change that the national societies of Western Europe underwent from the sixteenth century on constitutes one of the imperative reference points for anyone who attempts to explain macro-social change in a particular contemporary country or society. The Western European model is not the only one that can lead to modernity, and yet, undoubtedly, it is the original model.

The notion of social modernization entails – as a minimum, and of necessity – a series of transformational processes geared toward: (1) creating a productive structure capable of achieving sustained economic development

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and growth, in such a way that sufficient material resources are made available to attain an improvement in the standard of living of the population as a whole, in keeping with the current technology and expectations, as well as maintaining the autonomy of the society vis-à-vis exterior forces; (2) creating – alongside the above-mentioned process – power and authority structures allowing for the formulation and implementation of national policies able to channel and co-ordinate the efforts made by the society as a whole to achieve its overall aims, one of which is material development.

Depending on the author and on the school of thought he or she represents, to these two basic processes (indispensable elements in the definition) could be added other correlated variables, such as the increasing degree of rationality and secularization, or of social mobility and political participation.[1]

From a strictly political standpoint, what we are interested in observing is the second of the above processes, involving a change in the structures and functions of power that leads to an enhancement of the system's ability to meet, with relative efficiency, the challenge of constructing a national society that is both autonomous and feasible. This increased efficiency in the utilization of social resources for the attainment of general goals can be achieved by various means, the importance and possible combinations of which will vary in accordance with the specific case in question. Thus, in certain instances the differentiation and specialization of institutions is the keystone to the process of modernizing transformation, whereas in other cases perhaps the key lies in the concentration of power in pre-existing institutions; in still others, it could be an increase in participation of the members of the system in the decision-making process. Ideally, any study of political modernization should be multi-dimensional, taking into account the reciprocal influence of the variables into which one decides to break down the phenomenon from a theoretical point of view.

Given the limitations of an essay such as this, as well as the shortcomings in knowledge regarding the topic we are analysing (the historical transformation of the Mexican political system), the approach we shall follow will emphasize the process involving the concentration of power and its effects on the efficient utilization of resources for the country's economic development. We shall also be concerned with modifications in major political structures, as well as changes in the nature of participation by the social actors in political decision-making processes. The lack of a systematic treatment of cultural variables does not mean that they are any less important, nor does it presuppose a type of causality that makes them dependent upon other changes occurring. Rather, it simply reflects the absence of monographs that would allow us to arrive at generalizations which in other fields of knowledge it is possible to draw up.

The Starting-point

Taking the year 1867 as the starting-point of the political modernization of Mexico is very arbitrary, and yet, at the same time, is even more advisable. In effect, the execution of Ferdinand Maximilian of Hapsburg in Queretaro on 19 June 1867 serves as a dramatic symbol of the defeat of the Conservative Party's political scheme, by which it purported to guide Mexico's development within the traditional framework of the monarchy. In 1867 the victorious Liberal Party, whose president and leader was Benito Juárez, was left without an enemy on the ideological front. The destruction of the Second Empire paved the way for the realization of the idea of a Mexican nation based on republican, democratic, and federal structures grounded on a liberal economy. The legal document that was to act as a framework for such a project would be the Constitution of 1857 – which had provoked a fight to the death between Liberals and Conservatives immediately following its enactment – a document that authorized the separation and balance of powers in a fashion quite similar to the American model and, in addition, all the individual freedoms befitting the most advanced brand of liberalism of the time.[2]

Unfortunately, the social and material bases for carrying out this "American-style" modernizing scheme were rather inadequate, if not totally non-existent. To begin with, Mexico's political tradition was very different from the British one: it had a heritage of three centuries of Spanish colonialism, in which there was no place for self-government in the real sense of the term. This was, rather, a paternalistic and authoritarian tradition.

In 1867 the social foundations of Mexico remained those of the indigenous population, and for that reason they were far removed from the liberal political ethos. Of the approximately 8 million inhabitants comprising Mexico's population at that time, half or perhaps more could be considered natives; that is, peasants, lacking a national awareness, who lived in small communities, partially dependent upon a subsistence economy but also supplying labour for the market economy (mainly for the haciendas and mines), who spoke a wide range of dialects and often had little or no knowledge of the Spanish language. The second group, in numerical terms, was composed of mestizos, dwellers in large towns and cities, who filled the ranks of artisans, small businessmen, bureaucrats, the army and several of the higher political posts. At the top of the pyramid were the Creoles or European mestizos, who, apart from occupying the top political and military positions, comprised the bulk of the large landowners and merchants. Finally there was a small group of foreigners who took part in directing the economy and, therefore, the life-styles of the Creoles.[3]

This social structure based on race and class had led to a significant fragmentation of Mexican society which practically all the political leaders of the

era bemoaned; and yet it was extremely hard to overcome in the short term. Immigration and education were two of the solutions most stoutly advocated, but neither was really put into practice. The economy, which could have acted as a dynamic agent for social change, was in a most deplorable state. By 1860 Mexico's national income was lower (by 10 per cent) than at the turn of the century.[4] Mining, which in the past had been the dynamic sector, was still suffering from the ravages caused by the War for Independence (1810–1821), by foreign invasions, and by the constant internal strife that had preceded the triumph of the Liberals.

The victory won by Benito Juárez and the Liberal Party over the imperialists could not disguise the fact that, in 1867, Mexico's political panorama was a distressing one. From the time of Guadalupe Victoria's regime (1824–1829), the federal government had subsisted in permanent fiscal bankruptcy and in the midst of constant instability. Decades of political chaos had given way to an appreciable diffusion of power at the centre in favour of local caciques. These regional "bigwigs" had their own means of coercion and lived off the *alcabalas* (sales taxes) levied on domestic trade and other taxes that hindered the establishment of a true national market and economy.[5]

This triumph of localism and regionalism during the first half of the nineteenth century was favoured by the very geography of the country. Mexico's great mountainous barriers and deserts, and the lack of navigable rivers, fostered a retrogression to a kind of feudalization of the country, creating interests that were to resist the changes outlined in the liberal scheme.

From a cultural perspective, Mexico's social fragmentation and heterogeneity – combined with its regionalism – proved to be very significant obstacles to the creation of an effective national conscience. On the other hand, the symbols which long ago had joined the inhabitants of New Spain had since disappeared or lost their legitimacy in the eyes of the new rulers, i.e. the crown and the Catholic church. For the majority of the Mexican population in the mid-nineteenth century, the new emblems with which attempts were made to replace the old ones ("the rights of man", citizenship, democracy, the nation, etc.) simply had no meaning. Besides the Catholic faith, the basic loyalties were those felt towards the local community and the region.[6]

Economic Liberalism and Political Authoritarianism

The way in which the victors of 1867 were to solve their dilemma regarding Mexico's development was by combining economic liberalism with political authoritarianism. As one of the instigators of this process justified it at the beginning of the twentieth century, "It had been necessary to postpone political development in order to establish the material foundations upon which it could be supported."[7]

The period dominated by the figure of Benito Juárez (1867–1872) was characterized by a constant struggle between the Executive and the other branches of government. The regime of Porfirio Díaz (1876–1880 and 1884–1911) witnessed the total triumph of the presidency over the legislative and judicial branches and the victory of the federal government over the state governments, where local legislatures and judicial systems were nullified in favour of the governors. The Constitution of 1857 remained in force, but by the close of the nineteenth century it had become merely an empty shell.[8]

Juárez's fundamental task consisted of facing up to the internal divisions affecting the Liberal coalition, which on more than one occasion ended in outright rebellion. Similarly, he found it necessary to undermine the power of the army and of the big local caciques. Upon the death of Juárez, the dispute over his succession was settled in the old-fashioned way: thus in 1876, a triumphant military rebellion put General Porfirio Díaz at the head of the Mexican government.

It was during Porfirio Díaz's second term as President (1884–1888) that the bases for his dictatorship were established. At that time, the presidency came to dominate the Legislative Branch to such an extent that it did away with any possible opposition from the houses of the legislature. Once Congress had been subordinated to the will of the Executive, the Judicial Branch lost the limited autonomy it still had. After 1888, elections were held punctually and at all levels, but in no case did they serve to determine anything because, on a national level, the opposition simply disappeared, and on a local plane it was manipulated by Díaz in order to suppress the displays of independence which some governors still made. The government of the Liberals ended in a personal dictatorship which was uninterrupted.

This process involving the concentration and centralization of power, initiated by Díaz in his first presidential term, came up against its greatest obstacle in the form of the federal nature of the republic, behind which the "bigwigs" in the states had become entrenched. These men had been instrumental in the triumph of the Liberals over the Conservatives; by this time, they had added great economic power to their already established political power.[9] Gradually the central government gained definitive control, thanks to an increase in its fiscal resources and to the wise utilization of the army as an element for neutralizing the governors. And while the army decreased in numbers, its level of professionalism was enhanced.

At the beginning of the twentieth century, General Díaz's power reached its peak. Legal opposition was non-existent and the clandestine opposition had yet to be consolidated. By then efforts in favour of economic modernization had already started to bear fruit and continued without serious obstacles

until the moment the Mexican Revolution commenced, in 1910. Between 1877 and 1910, Mexico's Gross Domestic Product rose by a factor of 3.2 in real terms. In certain specific branches of the economy – above all, in most modern ones – the progress made was even more remarkable. Thus, for example, the network of railways increased from 893 to 19,205 kilometres; the value of silver production jumped from slightly under 25 million pesos to over 85 million; and the production of industrial metals, such as copper and lead, was initiated. Ports were modernized, as well as the textile industry; a banking system worthy of bearing that name arose for the first time; and exports went up from 60 million pesos in 1877 to 270 million in 1910.[10]

The main basis of support and *raison d'être* of the Porfirian system was a small yet powerful oligarchy composed of landowners, which enhanced its wealth enormously in that period by acquiring lands expropriated from the church by the Liberals and lands similarly expropriated from native communities and through the transfer of public lands. According to the source used, it is estimated that by 1910 between 82 and 97 per cent of the heads of families classified as peasants owned no land at all.[11] Nevertheless, the heart of Mexico's modern economy – railways, mines, banking, electricity and oil – was in the hands of foreign capital, rather than the domestic oligarchy. It was only at the close of this period, and exclusively insofar as the railways were concerned, that national control was eventually felt. But this was accomplished by the state, using foreign loans rather than private savings.

The destruction of Porfirio Díaz's regime in May 1911 – when the old dictator resigned as President and went into exile, forced to do so because of the triumph of the revolutionary forces – was due mostly to the regime's inability to transform its structures so as to accommodate the new political actors. Indeed, the extraordinary process of economic modernization had created a middle class for which there was no place in the Porfirian political set-up; the same was true of the working class which began to spring up in the shadow of railways, mines, foundries, and textile mills. It goes without saying that peasants and small landowners were not represented in any way at all. Even within the oligarchy itself there were dissatisfied sectors, because a mere handful of favourites – especially those of the so-called group of *científicos*[12] whose leader was the Minister of the Treasury – monopolized the positions of power. The process of renewal within the various élites was conspicuous by its absence in the Porfirian dictatorship, which, in the end, was a genuine gerontocracy.

Revolution and Renovation

The Mexican Revolution of 1910 began almost entirely as a movement claiming the reinstatement of the political rights destroyed by the dictatorship. At

first, demands calling for profound changes in the social structure were few in number. The leadership of this movement was essentially, although not exclusively, middle-class and even included some disaffected members of the upper class. There were not many leaders from the sectors comprising the majority, i.e. the peasantry. The regional nature of the movement was apparent from its outset, so much so that current Mexican historiography speaks not of a single revolution but of several which occurred simultaneously.[13] The initial political demands, born of the middle classes' desire to open up the system in order to share power with the landholding groups, were accompanied, not long thereafter, by the demands of the popular sectors allied to the revolutionary bourgeoisie. The political banner of the revolution can be summed up in the slogan of the Plan de San Luis of November 1910 (which is the initial document of the revolution): *Sufragio efectivo, no reelección* (effective suffrage, no re-election). However, it was not long before a group appeared taking up the cry of "land and liberty" as the motto for its struggle. The original demand posed by these agrarians was the return of the communal lands taken over by the large haciendas, but with the passage of time they would call for the destruction of the haciendas themselves and the distribution of the lands – regardless of their primary source – among the peasants who worked them. Lastly, the nascent workers' movement – independently at first, and later in conjunction with other sectors – pressed for the right of affiliation, the right to strike and, finally, a commitment on the part of its political allies to the effect that the new regime arising out of the revolution would back up all the demands made by the labour movements of the era, demands that had only been accepted in very few places: an eight-hour work-day, a minimum wage, special protection for women and children, medical services, housing, schools, etc.

The revolution came up against serious obstacles in the form of the army of the old regime at first, and of foreign powers later. In 1914, the combined forces of the different revolutionary movements achieved the total destruction of the professional army. At the same time, the international conflict of the revolution gave way to a strong anti-imperialist sentiment which harbingered greater control of foreign capital by the new state. Between 1914 and 1916 the distinct tendencies of the revolution fought one another in an attempt to gain hegemony. The victor of this fierce intra-revolutionary strife was the most moderate faction, committed to effect political changes and, to a much lesser degree, social ones. In any event, this group led by Venustiano Carranza – who owned land in the state of Coahuila and had played a minor role as a politician under Porfirio Díaz – was to adopt a new Constitution in February 1917, wherein the agrarian reform and workers' rights (enumerated very extensively) were codified, the oil deposits which were being exploited by foreign companies were nationalized, and virtually all rights for religious organizations were cut off. In addition, the new Constitution maintained the

separation of powers, although it clearly gave preference to the Executive over the other two branches and it assigned the state greater responsibilities with regard to the promotion of economic development. The vision of the world held by those who forged this new constitutional framework was not liberal, and although private property continued to constitute the basis of the economy, it was no longer the sole basis for it.[14]

The Constitution of 1917, rather than reflecting the situation that actually prevailed in Mexico, was much more a plan for the future. In reality, it was a new programme designed to attain an old objective: a stable political and social order – social justice being the indispensable condition for stability – and a modern economy. This economy still appeared to be based on agriculture and the extractive industries. Very few, if any, dared to conjure up the image of a truly industrial Mexico.

When the new Constitution was put into effect, the political disintegration of the country was far from being remedied. In fact, between 1914 and 1916 a national government simply did not exist. The political system was broken up into different segments and, as in the past, the caciques dominated the regions.[15] Carranza's main task, as the first president elected in accordance with the norms established by the new Constitution, consisted of trying to put an end to the elements of rebellion and banditry which were laying the country to waste, and of ensuring that the authority of the President prevailed over that of the army. In the end, he was not completely successful in this undertaking and he lost his life to a military rebellion launched by the new revolutionary army.

The rebellion of 1920 which stripped Carranza of power was the last one to be successful in Mexico. Indeed, it laid the foundations for a period of stability which few at the time would have imagined was to be one of the longest-lasting in Latin America.

The Organization of the New Regime

The main task that fell to the government headed by General Alvaro Obregón (1920–1924) was to negotiate the surrender or elimination of the various groups of revolutionaries or reactionaries still up in arms. It had great success in this endeavour, for it secured the surrender of the agrarian revolutionaries known as *zapatistas*[16] in the south and of the remaining forces of Francisco Villa in the north; the withdrawal of the reactionary movement under the orders of General Félix Díaz, nephew of the old dictator; and the surrender of the counter-revolutionary movement led by Manuel Peláez in Tamaulipas, of peasant bands under Saturnino Cedillo in San Luis Potosí, and of many other less important groups.

To a large extent, Obregón achieved his goal by means of co-optation,

legitimizing (through recognition by the central government) the power and presence of groups and caciques in the regions where they were actually influential. Thus, the central government's power was derived from its ability to negotiate with its most important generals and with the rebels who had laid down their arms. From 1923 to 1929 there were three attempts at military rebellion which were struck down by the federal government. Upon the elimination of each of them, the government gained increasing strength.

President Plutarco Elías Calles (1924–1928) found that he was strong enough to face up to the rebellion of the Catholic church, which had not resigned itself to the tremendous limitations imposed upon it by the new Constitution. Between 1926 and 1929, the central part of the country suffered the consequences of a fierce religious war which ended in 1929 only after it had become apparent that the government could not replace the Catholic ecclesiastical structure with a new national Catholic church linked to the revolutionary regime, nor could the rebels aspire to destroy the new regime.[17] From the year 1929, a kind of *modus vivendi* began to take shape between the Catholic church and the state which, to a large extent, alienated the Catholic hierarchy from the political process. In this way, the state reaffirmed the dominant position it had gradually gained since the triumph of the Liberals, in 1867.

In 1928–1929 the new political system that had been born as a result of the revolution was put to a difficult test, from which it was to emerge greatly strengthened. In 1928, contrary to the fundamental principles of the revolutionary movement, General Obregón – the great *caudillo* (commander) of the era – managed to get the Constitution amended so as to allow him to be re-elected for the 1928–1934 term of office. Nevertheless, shortly after the elections he was assassinated by a religious militant. The disappearance of the most important *caudillo* figure enabled General Calles to re-establish the principle of non-reelection before he himself left office, as well as to begin to organize a government political party in which practically all the prominent personages of the times were included. Thus, the National Revolutionary Party (PNR) became the framework within which political life in Mexico was to develop from that time on; that was how the importance of the army as an essential political instrument came to decline.[18]

From its very beginnings, the PNR became *the* dominant party, and not just "another party." Its major role would not be to win elections, since its victory was assured, in advance, through legal and illegal channels. From that moment forward, its main function consisted of instilling a stern sense of discipline in the members of the revolutionary coalition (i.e. in the "revolutionary family," as it was then called) and of transforming itself into a machine for social mobilization and propaganda during election periods.

The programme of the PNR was, in essence, to implement the most progressive articles of the Constitution of 1917. Yet, during its first years in

existence, the real actions taken in that sense were rather limited, because the party's leadership became quite conservative. The party was not very democratic on an internal level: there was much imposition from above, from its leaders, especially from General Calles who, despite the fact that he was no longer President of the country, continued to be the *factotum* of Mexican politics until the middle of 1935. He personally – and not the party's conventions – determined who was to fill the presidency, governorships, and seats in the legislative houses. Without a doubt, with the demise of the last *caudillo* of the revolution – namely, General Obregón – and the founding of the PNR, there was a concentration of power, but that concentration was in the hands of a single person, rather than an institution. This was because from 1929 to 1935, Calles (who could not become president again) refused to accept formal posts within the political structure. When he did so, he was prompted by specific circumstances and only remained there for a brief time. Basically, Calles' power was informal, although it was exceedingly real.

By the end of the 1920s, it was evident that the political system of the new regime had an essential feature in common with the old one – that is, the existence of democratic forms devoid of all content. In effect, at that point it was evident to all observers that the partisan opposition had absolutely no possibility of coming to power and that the separation of powers existed only to the extent that certain governors had a force of their own – be it military or social – capable of allowing them to negotiate with the central government, rather than due to a federal set-up that was truly in force. The same thing happened with the Congress: representatives and senators only wielded power to the degree that they represented strong governors. For its part, the Judicial Branch never had an opportunity to exercise its supposed independence.

The Culmination of the Process

In 1934 the official candidate to the presidency, General Lázaro Cárdenas, was victorious over an almost non-existent opposition. It was expected that his government would continue to be dominated by the figure of Calles, but towards the middle of 1935, with the support of the army on the one hand and of the workers' organizations on the other, Cárdenas wrested informal power from Calles and embarked upon a rapid and remarkable process whereby power became concentrated in the presidency.

Once Calles had been eliminated as a political factor in the latter part of 1934, General Cárdenas placed himself at the forefront of a drive to organize the masses of peasants and urban workers. In order to achieve this goal in the countryside, Cárdenas proceeded to carry out a land reform that virtually did away with the haciendas. In his six-year term of office (from 1934 to 1940), he

distributed twice as much land as all his predecessors combined, starting with Venustiano Carranza. And along with land, he handed over arms to the peasants, uniting them in the first real national agrarian organization, the National Peasant Confederation (CNC), whose leaders were unconditional supporters of the President.

Parallel to the political transformations occurring in the Mexican countryside, another similar process took place among urban labourers. In that sector there were already several federations contending for control of the workers, but as the result of an alliance forged between the President and union leaders in the heat of the conflict with Calles, the Mexican Workers' Federation (CTM) was established.

This organization sought to group together all existing unions and, at the same time, step up the process of unionization among a great mass of labourers and employees who still were not organized at all. Therefore, the CTM had the full support of the state and embarked upon a process of organization and strikes, the apogee of which was the strike of the recently established National Union of Oil Workers, culminating in the expropriation of that industry in March 1938. The strikes and joint contracts negotiated by the unions – with Cárdenas as a benevolent onlooker – resulted in a material improvement of the conditions of the organized working class in exchange for which the workers supported presidential policies, albeit with a slightly greater degree of autonomy than that enjoyed by the peasant sector.

In 1938, Cárdenas not only consolidated the nationalism of the revolution through the expropriation of the country's petroleum resources, but also modified the internal structure of the PNR so as to provide for the changes made in the organization of labourers and peasants. The official party was transformed into the Party of the Mexican Revolution (PRM), which would no longer be organized on the basis of individual affiliation but, rather, by means of its sectors. The four basic sectors were peasants, labourers, the military, and the popular sector (which was, essentially, members of the governmental bureaucracy). With this corporative structure – a product of Cárdenas' policy favouring the masses – the presidency acquired even greater power than it had enjoyed under Porfirio Díaz. Yet, unlike the old regime, this power was centred in the presidency rather than in the person of the President, as was clearly apparent in 1940, when Cárdenas left the leadership of the country in the hands of his successor, General Manuel Avila Camacho, without attempting to get himself re-elected, as Obregón had done, or trying to wield power "from behind the throne" like Calles.[19]

The elections held in 1940 were very violent. The opposition to the official party and to its populist policies (the PRM proposed to build a democracy of the workers) not only originated in the old counter-revolutionary sectors, but also in the very heart of the group in power. The right wing of the revolution abandoned the PRM and lent its support to the candidacy of General Juan

Andrew Almazán. However, both the President and the PRM overpowered their adversary using every means at their disposal, including force. The important thing is that once the elections were over, the opposing coalition simply disbanded, and once again the official party remained without a single adversary.[20] In December 1940, the new president – General Manuel Avila Camacho – ordered the military sector within the PRM to be disbanded. In order to guarantee its existence, the authoritarianism of the revolution no longer needed the army, or at least not in the way it had used it in the past; the organizations of the masses were to be its true basis of support.

By 1940, all the major components of the current political system were already in place. Unlike the old regime, which was a product of the triumph of Liberalism, the new regime that had arisen as a result of the Mexican Revolution had wide social foundations, and was willing to include in the coalition all the major social forces that economic change would fashion in the future. The concentration of power was just as appreciable as under the dictatorship of Porfirio Díaz, yet this time the centre of power was no longer personalized, but rather institutionalized in the presidency, and the holder of that office had no chance of being re-elected. Therefore the turnover, every six years, of part of the political élite was also institutionalized.

With this more diversified and institutionalized power structure, based to a greater degree on participation by the diverse sectors of society than the one that had prevailed until 1910, the country entered a stage of economic growth such as it had not experienced since the beginning of the revolution. This growth was soon to change the traditional agrarian nature of Mexican society.

Notes

1. To this effect, cf. Daniel Lerner and James Coleman, "Modernization."
2. Regarding the process of elaborating the Constitution and the spirit of its authors, see Francisco Zarco, *Historia del congresco extraordinario constituyente de 1856–1957* (Talleres de "La Ciencia Jurídica," Mexico City, 1898–1901).
3. The classical study concerning Mexican social organization in the nineteenth century is the one by Andrés Molina Enríquez: *Los grandes problemas nacionales* (Imprenta de A. Carranza e Hijos, Mexico City, 1909).
4. See John Coatsworth, "Obstacles to Economic Growth in Nineteenth-century Mexico" *American Historical Review*, vol. 83, no. 1 (1978), p. 82.
5. On this point, besides the above-mentioned work by Coatsworth, the reader may consult Ciro Cardoso et al., *México en el siglo XIX (1821 a 1910). Historia económica y de la estructura social* (Nueva Imagen, Mexico City, 1980). See also the pertinent section in Leopoldo Solís, *La realidad económica mexicana. Retrovisión y perspectivas* (Siglo XXI, Mexico City, 1970).
6. For a notion as to the average Mexican's way of life during that era, see Luis González et al., in Daniel Cosío Villegas, ed., *Historia moderna de México. La República Restaurada. La vida social* (Editorial Hermes, Mexico City, 1957).
7. This is the conclusion reached by Justo Sierra in his work entitled *La evolución política del pueblo mexicano* (Fondo de Cultura Económica, Mexico City, 1950).
8. For a detailed account of political processes during the regimes of Benito Juárez and Porfirio Díaz, see the volumes on Mexican domestic political life in: Daniel Cosío Villegas, *Historia moderna de México* (Editorial Hermes, Mexico City, 1955, 1970, and 1972).
9. A case exemplifying this regional power can be found in the figure of Luis Terrazas, a "bigwig" in the State of Chihuahua; in this regard, see José Fuentes Mares, *Y México se refugió en el desierto: Luis Terrazas, historia y destino* (Editorial Jus, Mexico City, 1954).
10. For an account and analysis of the economy during Porfirio Díaz's regime, see Daniel Cosío Villegas, ed., *Historia moderna en México. El Porfiriato. La vida económica*, 2 vols. (Editorial Hermes, Mexico City, 1965). For these statistical figures, see El Colegio de México, *Estadísticas económicas del Porfiriato* (El Colegio de México, Mexico City, 1960).
11. See Moisés González Navarro, *Estadísticas sociales del Porfiriato, 1887–1910* (Dirección General de Estadística, Mexico City, 1956), pp. 40–41; also Jesús Silva Herzog, *El agrarismo mexicano y la reforma agraria. Exposición y crítica* (Fondo de Cultura Económica, Mexico City, 1966), p. 502.
12. Literally, the "scientists," the group of officials who surrounded President Porfirio Díaz and made up the "inner cabinet" of his government. The *científicos* were greatly influenced by the positivist philosophy of Auguste Comte and believed that Mexico could progress fastest by the use of scientific methods.
13. Some of the studies underlining most clearly the nature of leadership and its regional variations are, *inter alia*: James Cockroft, *Intellectual Precursors of the Mexican Revolution, 1900–1913* (University of Texas Press, Austin, 1968); John Womack, Jr., *Zapata and the Mexican Revolution* (Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1968); Héctor Aguilar Camín, *La frontera nómada. Sonora y la Revolución Mexicana* (Siglo XXI, Mexico City, 1977); Romana Falcón, *Revolución y caciquismo. San Luis Potosí 1910–1938* (El Colegio de Mexico, Mexico City, 1984); and Frans Schryer, *The Rancheros of Pisaflores. The History of a Peasant Bourgeoisie in Twentieth Century Mexico* (University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 1980).
14. For a concise analysis of the forces that shaped the Constitution of 1917, as well as their importance and implications, see Charles C. Cumberland, *Mexican Revolution: The Constitutionalist Years* (University of Texas Press, Austin, 1972); also Eberhardt V. Niemeyer, *Revolution at Queretaro: The Mexican Constitutional Convention of 1916–1917* (University of Texas Press, Austin, 1974).
15. For an example of this form of rule by caciques, see Romana Falcón (note 13 above).
16. Followers of Emiliano Zapata, one of the major leaders of the Mexican Revolution.
17. On this point, see the work by Jean Meyer entitled *La cristiada*, 3 vols. (Siglo XXI, Mexico City, 1973).
18. For more on this topic, See Alejandra Lajous, *Los orígenes del partido único en México* (Universidad Nacional Autónoma de Mexico, Mexico City, 1979).
19. An analysis of the nature of Cardenism can be found in Arnaldo Córdova, *La política de masas del cardenismo* (Editorial Era, Mexico City, 1974).
20. See Albert L. Michaels, "Las elecciones de 1940," in *Historia mexicana*, vol. 21 (1971), pp. 80–134.